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Comment  Susan M. Wachter
Authors Jaﬀee and Quigley focus their chapter on an analysis of federal 
programs that provide insurance and housing credit guarantees. After a 
description of a variety of federal government programs, including the 
federally-  chartered government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, they concentrate speciﬁ  cally on the changes and chal-
lenges to the mortgage insurance and guarantee programs managed by the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA). They oﬀer speciﬁ  c, policy-  oriented 
recommendations to bolster the FHA’s declining market share.
After the Great Depression, the FHA pioneered the introduction of the 
thirty- year  self- amortizing  ﬁ  xed rate mortgage, the standard mortgage that 
prevailed in the United States for decades. The FHA and Fannie Mae, and 
its predecessor the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC)—a federal 
entity—succeeded in reviving a mortgage market then in collapse due to the 
prevalence of “bullet” loans. After World War II, loans insured by the FHA 
lost market share to similarly structured nongovernment or “conventional” 
loans. The FHA’s role evolved to serve lower income households who lacked 
the 10 percent down payment required by the conventional prime market. 
With the explosion (now implosion) of subprime over the past decade, 
FHA’s market share decreased even further until 2008 when, in response 
to the collapse of subprime, FHA market share increased to its current 25 
percent level. The ongoing subprime mortgage market crisis (similar to the 
Great Depression, centered on loans that require reﬁ  nancing at a time when 
ﬁ  nancial markets seize up) makes the role of the FHA newly relevant.1
A large segment of the Jaﬀee and Quigley chapter is devoted to a com-
prehensive and very useful description of all federal housing programs. 
The chapter sets out an historical and contextual analysis of the evolution 
of housing programs over time, pointing to the elimination of supply-  side 
public housing in favor of demand-  side housing vouchers. The chapter 
contrasts this—and other directly funded programs that have lost federal 
support—with the growth of programs indirectly funded through federal 
tax expenditures, including the homeowner deduction and the low income 
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housing tax credit. Direct federal funding for all housing programs has 
declined signiﬁ  cantly over time. Why is this so? What have we lost or gained? 
The authors do not take on these questions or the overarching question 
of what is the appropriate role of federal government in housing. Such a 
perspective might have helped as they transition into conclusions for the 
programs which they do delve into in more detail.
The major part of the chapter is focused on federal support for housing 
credit. After a description of the history of the GSEs, the authors take on 
the controversy of the source of GSE funding. They soundly come down in 
favor of funding with pass-  through securities with limits on portfolio lend-
ing rather than through expanded portfolio lending. They point out that 
taxpayers bear contingent liability for the latter if the GSEs take on interest-
 rate risk. The Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) did 
in fact put retained mortgage portfolio limits in place, in part in response to 
the GSE’s accounting diﬃculties; only to lift these as the mortgage market 
deteriorated in 2008.
The authors also take the position that the implicit subsidy received 
by the GSEs could be better “spent” from a distributional perspective if 
the GSEs were forced by lower conforming loan limits to lend to a lower 
income portion of the market. Recent legislation has lifted conforming 
loan limits.
In the aftermath of the subprime crisis, legislators have looked to the 
GSEs as well as to the FHA to expand their roles. The authors argue for 
an expanded role for the FHA and for a more limited role for the GSEs. 
It may be that now is the time to rely on the FHA and Ginnie Mae, which 
securitizes FHA mortgages. Nonetheless, it would have been useful for 
the authors to take this question on explicitly. These institutions and their 
markets are linked and both the FHA insured mortgages and the GSEs’ 
“agency” mortgage-  backed securities (MBS) market have secure funding 
sources, an important distinction, given the seizing up of the private sources 
of “private label” funding for subprime mortgages. Moreover, except for the 
discussion of interest rate risk, the authors do not directly take on the ques-
tion of burgeoning mortgage default risk and how it relates to the growth 
of the subprime market and the private label mortgage-  backed securities 
market and the market for MBS derivatives, Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs). Nonetheless, the authors are prescient in their implicit reliance on 
government guaranteed FHA rather than on the Fannie/  Freddie model, 
since, through conservancy, they have become government guaranteed mort-
gage companies as well.
The authors’ recommendations are timely because they oﬀer their view 
of what long-  term policy dealing with subprime should be. The essence of 
their recommendation is to expand the FHA’s market share by reshaping the 
FHA to take on some aspects of the subprime market, in order to allow the 
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suggestion, it is useful to point to the key diﬀerences in these two mortgage 
markets as currently designed.
Subprime mortgages are designed for borrowers with impaired credit 
records. Unlike FHA insured and GSE guaranteed mortgages, subprime 
mortgages “price” risk. On the other hand, for borrowers who meet the risk 
thresholds of the FHA and the GSEs, a more or less uniform mortgage rate 
is charged for accepted loans. That is, risk- based pricing is limited and lower 
risk borrowers cross-  subsidize higher risk borrowers.
The authors attribute the decline in FHA loans to four factors: subprime 
lending, predatory lending, GSE competition, and the failure of the FHA 
to oﬀer innovative mortgage products. The developments that they point to 
as helping conventional markets are advances in underwriting technology 
and growth in private mortgage securitization, in addition to GSE market 
share growth.
The simple explanation for the FHA decline in market share, however, 
is apparent in the graph shown in ﬁ  gure 5C.1: FHA market share declined 
as subprime market share grew (GAO 2007). Why subprime took market 
share away from the FHA is not directly addressed. Two obvious explana-
tions are that subprime lending criteria were liberal to nonexistent and that 
short-  run mortgage payments (before teaser rates adjusted) were lower and 
more “aﬀordable.”
The authors oﬀer a normative policy analysis and a fundamental 
repurposing of the FHA. The new purpose in short is “to counter the growth 
of subprime and predatory lending associated with subprime.” They suggest 
that an aggressive and innovative loan demonstration by the FHA can be 
an eﬃcient means of redressing the extent of predatory lending, especially 
to lower income clientele.
To do so, they propose legislation that would enable the FHA to develop 
mortgage contracts that would oﬀer competitive terms to those attracted 
to the subprime market, but also eligible for FHA funding. The authors 
mention the incorporation of innovative tools, including teaser rates, as 
well as risk-  based pricing. In order to assist borrowers who are unaware 
of alternatives and therefore are subject to predatory pricing, the authors 
recommend that the FHA oﬀer one or more alternative mortgages for con-
sideration at least several days before a scheduled house closing; the terms of 
the mortgage would be transmitted to the borrower in a side- by- side format, 
which compares the FHA mortgage to the subprime mortgage being oﬀered. 
Mortgage contracts would not be enforceable unless the borrower house-
hold explicitly rejected the FHA mortgage in favor of the private, subprime 
mortgage. The authors couple this policy approach with an additional rec-
ommendation that mortgage lenders be required to abide by a duty of suit-
ability similar to the system upheld in the stock-  broker industry. Together 
they believe these requirements would be a powerful deterrent to predatory 
lending. They argue that this approach could militate against informational 128        Dwight M. Jaffee and John M. Quigley
asymmetry, particularly for inexperienced borrowers who are unaware of 
alternative, more beneﬁ  cial mortgage contracts for which they also qualify. 
The authors thus suggest that the best way to redress asymmetric informa-
tion for the buyer is to create a standardized FHA loan comparable to sub-
prime and require that this loan be disclosed by all lenders extending loans 
to lower income clientele.2
While of great value, such a recommendation raises questions, especially 
in light of the subprime crisis. If the FHA were really to compete would it 
have to oﬀer the teaser rate adjustable-  rate mortgages (ARMs) that have 
been at the center of the subprime crisis and arguably were a major source 
of the growth in subprime and loss of FHA market share? It may very well 
be that the growth of these loans, in particular, allowed subprime to out-
compete the FHA, since these loans were aﬀordable in a period of rising 
housing prices, when other loans were not.
Or let us assume that such loans are ruled out because they could not meet 
a standard of suitability.3 Would the FHA’s role be to match the subprime 
2. The authors’ suggestions are similar to those given in Barr, Sendhil, and Shaﬁ  r (2008), 
where it is argued that borrowers should be presented with an “opt-  out mortgage plan” to 
mitigate the problem of asymmetric information. Borrowers would receive a standard set of 
mortgages with easily understandable terms and strong underwriting. A borrower would then 
have to explicitly “opt-  out” of the mortgage if they chose not to participate.
3. For a discussion on the relative beneﬁ  ts of suitability versus a standard, see Wachter (2003) 
and Engel and McCoy (2002).
Fig. 5C.1    Market participants’ share of home purchase mortgage market: 1996 
to 2005
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market’s pricing for allowable loans? But of course the subprime loans that 
were being made during the run-  up to the mortgage crisis were not fully 
pricing risk. Subprime loans were higher risk without bearing suﬃciently 
higher return to cover the risk.
If the FHA had gone this way, it would have required immediate taxpayer 
support and a bailout, undermining the current circumstances under which 
the FHA has been used as a platform to assist the struggling mortgage mar-
ket and borrowers in distress. The history of ﬁ  nancial markets suggests that 
episodes of mispricing and underpricing of risk are not avoidable. Markets 
appear to be backward- looking in terms of their assessment of risk. In good 
times risk is assumed to be low and after a crisis, risk is reevaluated and lend-
ing rates spike. The subprime lending industry appears to have followed this 
pattern. Going forward, should the FHA attempt to compete and follow 
market- pricing patterns? If it does not, then these parallel mortgages will be 
irrelevant, and once again the FHA will lose market share. If it does then the 
FHA too will be subject to mispricing, adding to market volatility.4
The ultimate questions are how much risk and volatility do we want in our 
mortgage ﬁ  nance system? Wall Street will price any risk and procyclically 
misprice risk, especially in the absence of price discovery mechanisms. The 
private label securitization system discouraged standardized, liquid MBS 
and CDOs that would have enabled short sellers to trade and to take the 
other side of bets that were wrongly made. Investors in these instruments 
took on great risk, which was not compensated by higher required returns. 
When they did so, they also exposed borrowers and the overall economy 
to increased house price volatility and risk. Such lending ﬁ  nanced through 
MBS, even with diversiﬁ  ed loan portfolios, is entirely exposed to systemic 
risk. Negatively amortizing and teaser rate mortgages that require reﬁ  nanc-
ing to avoid certain default have risk that is correlated, engendering systemic 
risk similar to that created by the mortgages prevalent during the Great 
Depression. The procyclical easing of lending standards and underpricing 
of risk is an endemic problem, not likely to be corrected by the useful but 
limited solutions put forth here.
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